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This  article  considers  the  relation  between  language  and  categorical  perception  (CP)  of  color.  Two  opposite  theories  are  
reviewed,  the  universalist  position  arguing  that  categories  are    universal  with  an  essentially  biological  origin,  and  the  relativ-­
ist  position  that  holds  that  color  categories  are  essentially  arbitrary  and  derive  from  color  terms  of  the  speaker’s  language.  
A  review  of  the  human  literature  presents  developmental,  neuropsychological,  cross-­cultural,  neuro-­imaging  and  computer  
simulation  evidence  that  CP  of  colors  has  at  least  partly  linguistic  origins.  As  animal  studies  also  contribute  to  this  debate,  
we  then  review  evidence  of  CP  in  the  visual  and  auditory  domains,  and  pinpoint  the  inconsistencies  of  the  literature.  To  
make  a  direct  comparison  between  humans  and  monkeys,  experimental  studies  compared  humans  and  baboons  for  their  
color  thresholds  and  in  a  recognition  memory  task  designed  to  assess  CP  of  colors.  Only  humans  showed  better  between-­
category  than  within-­category  discrimination  performance,  suggesting  species  differences  in  the  processing  of  a  color  con-­
tinuum.  That  study  along  with  some  of  our  previous  research  supports  the  theory  of  a  linguistic  origin  for  color  categories  
in  humans.
Keywords:  
The  role  of  language  in  promoting  symbolic  reasoning  is  
often   given   as   critical   in   considerations   of   the   intellectual  
difference  between  humans  and  other  primates  (e.g.,  Premack,  
1983;;  Thompson  &  Oden,  2000).  However,   if   language   is  
the  critical  factor,  there  is  a  non-­obvious  consequence.  One  
RXJKW WR ¿QG FURVVVSHFLHV GLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKH DSSDUHQWO\
non-­verbal   task   of   color   categorization   because   recent  
cross-­lingual  and  neuroimaging   investigations  have  shown  
a  linguistic  component  to  its  performance  (Davidoff,  2001;;  
Davidoff,  Davies  &  Roberson,  1999;;  Roberson  &  Davidoff,  
2000;;  Roberson,  Davidoff,  Davies  &  Shapiro,  2004,  2005;;  
Roberson,   Davies   &   Davidoff,   2000;;   Siok,   Kay,   Wang,  
Chan,  Chen,   Luke  &  Tan,   2009;;  Tan,  Chan,  Kay,  Khong,  
Yip   &   Luke,   2008;;   Thierry,   Athanasopoulos,   Wiggett,  
Dering   &   Kuipers,   2009;;   Winawer,   Witthoft,   Frank,   Wu  
&  Boroditsky,   2007;;   see   also  Kay  &  Kempton,   1984).   In  
one   of   the   neuroimaging   studies,   Tan   et   al.   (2008)   even  
showed   activation   of   language   areas   of   the   brain   for   the  
simple,   apparently   purely   visual,   task   of   judging   whether  
two  colors  were   the  same  or  different.  We  could   therefore  
argue  that  one  of  the  functions  of  language  or  more  generally  
of   symbols  must   be   to   allow  within-­   and   between-­subject  
DJUHHPHQWRQ WKH UDQJHRIFRORUV WREHGH¿QHGE\DFRORU
category.  Computer   simulations  of  color  category   learning  
come   to   a   similar   conclusion   because   robots   with   human  
color   vision   do   not   arrive   at   the   same   color   categories   as  
each   other   unless   they   communicate   (Steels  &  Belpaeme,  
2005).     This   language-­based  or  “relativist”  view  about   the  
formation  of  color  categories  is  contrasted  to  an  alternative  
view   that   color   categories   are   universal   (Berlin   &   Kay,  
1969).  In  a  large  scale-­review  of  many  languages,  Berlin  and  
Kay  (1969)  showed  that  there  were  systematic  regularities  in  
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the  way  colors  were  categorized.    It  is  these  two  views  that  
are  contrasted  as  a  distinction  between  nature  and  nurture.
For   the   relativist   position,   language   is   important   for  
color   categorization   because   that   task   is   different   to  most  
other   categorizations   as   has   been   argued   by   philosophers  
for   centuries   in   their   discussion   of   the   Sorites   paradox  
(Dummett,   1975;;   Wright,   1975;;   see   also   Roberson,  
Davidoff   &   Braisby,   1999).   The   essential   difference   is  
that   color   is   categorized   within   a   continuous   dimension.  
The  philosophical  contention   is   that  dividing  a  continuous  
variable  into  categories  is  not  possible  by  observation  alone;;  
UDWKHULWUHTXLUHVVRPHQRQSHUFHSWXDOMXVWL¿FDWLRQ$FODVVLF
example  concerns  the  color  spectrum.  Take  two  colors  that  
are  perceptually  indistinguishable  (say  the  two  colors  630nm  
and  629.9nm  that  we  would  call  red).  Suppose  the  629.9  nm  
color  has  its  wavelength  altered  to  629.8  nm.  As  this  color  
is  perceptually  indistinguishable  from  the  previous,  it  would  
also  have  to  be  called  red.  There  is  soon  a  paradox  because,  
if  we  continue  with  the  procedure,  eventually  we  will  have  
reached  the  opposite  end  of  the  spectrum  and  have  to  agree  
that   these  (blue)  colors  should  also  be  called  red.  Thus,   in  
order  to  resolve  the  paradox,  we  need  some  additional  and  
non-­perceptual  mechanism   such   as   color   labels   to  mark   a  
distinction  between  two  colors.  
Philosophical  issues  aside,  the  most  critical  aspect  of  color  
categories  is  that  our  perception  of  stimuli  from  continuously  
varying   dimensions   changes   when   it   is   categorical.  
Categorical   Perception   (CP;;   Harnad,   1987)   entails   that  
stimuli  from  the  same  category  become  to  look  more  similar  
to   each   other   and   more   different   to   stimuli   from   other  
FDWHJRULHV 7KH FHQWHUV RI FDWHJRULHV DUH FODVVL¿HG IDVWHU
than   those   at   the   edges   and   consequently   discrimination  
of  stimuli  is  better  across  than  within  categories.  It  is  such  
behavioral   consequences   that   we   look   for   when   deciding  
whether  an  individual  or  species  possesses  a  color  category.  
Two   lines   of   evidence   from   humans   have   converged   to  
the  conclusion  that  categorical  color  perception  is,  at  least,  
PRGXODWHGE\ODQJXDJH7KH¿UVWDQGPRVWGLUHFWOLQHFRPHV
from   studies   that   have   related   the   categorical   division   of  
stimuli  directly  to  experience  of  language  (e.g.,  Davidoff  et  
al.,  1999;;  Repp,  1984;;  Roberson  et  al.,  2000;;  Roberson  et  al.,  
2005;;  Strange  &  Jenkins,  1978).  Both  the  Berinmo  language  
(Davidoff  et  al.,  1999)  in  Papua  New  Guinea,  and  the  Himba  
language  (Roberson  et  al.,  2005)  which  is  spoken  in  Northern  
1DPLELD FRQWDLQ RQO\¿YH EDVLF FRORU WHUPV FRPSDUHG WR
the  eleven  in  English.  When  recognition  memory  for  color  
was  examined  in  both  these  remote  cultures,  the  Himba  and  
Berinmo   showed   no   memory   advantage   for   English   best  
examples  (Roberson  et  al.,  2005).  Instead,  speakers  of  each  
language  recognized  good  examples  of  their  own  linguistic  
color  categories  better  than  poor  examples,  regardless  of  the  
status  of  these  items  in  English  color  categories  (Roberson  
et  al.,  2005;;  see  also  Jameson  &  Alvarado,  2003  for  data  on  
Vietnamese  speakers).  
Roberson  et  al.  (2000,  2005)  also  investigated  CP  for  color  
in   speakers   of   English,   Berinmo   and  Himba.   For   English  
speakers,   pairs   of   colors   that   cross   the   boundary   (e.g.,  
between  blue  and  green)  were  discriminated  faster  and  more  
accurately  than  pairs  of  colors  with  equal  physical  separation  
that  are  either  both    green  or  both  blue  .  These  authors  also  
investigated  whether  speakers  of  Berinmo  and  Himba  would  
show  CP  at  the  boundaries  of  the  English  categories  green  
and  blue,  or  whether   the  Berinmo  and  Himba  show  CP  at  
category  boundaries  within  their  own  language  that  do  not  
exist  for  English  speakers.  Participants  were  shown  a  colored  
WDUJHWDQGKDGWRGHFLGHZKLFKRIWZRVWLPXOLSUHVHQWHG¿YH
seconds  later,  was  identical  to  the  target.  For  each  language  
tested,   performance   was   facilitated   when   the   target   and  
distractor  stimuli  had  different  color  names  (e.g.,  in  English,  
a   blue   target  with   a   green   distractor)   relative   to   the   same  
name   (e.g.,   in  English,   two   different   shades   of   blue).  The  
results  indicated  that  all  three  groups  of  participants  showed  
CP,  but  only  at  color  boundaries  that  were  explicitly  marked  
in  their  own  language.  Crucially,  there  was  no  effect  of  the  
proposed  universal  boundary  (Berlin  &  Kay,  1969)    between  
green  and  blue  for  speakers  of  Himba  and  Berinmo  whose  
languages  do  not  make  this  distinction.
A   criticism   of   this   cross-­lingual   research   is   that   it   used  
memory  tasks  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  language  
and  color  categorization.  A  strong  link  between  naming  and  
recognition  might  have  emerged  because  individuals  chose  
to   rely   on  verbal   coding   to   retain   information   about   color  
during   the   retention   interval   (Munnich   &   Landau,   2003).  
Subsequent  research  has  more  commonly  used  a  visual  search  
task  (Daoutis,  Pilling  &  Davies,  2006;;  Gilbert,  Regier,  Kay  
&  Ivry,  2006)  that  makes  little  or  no  demands  on  memory.  
3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUH WROG WR¿[DWHRQDFURVV LQ WKHFHQWHURI
the   computer   screen.   They   were   then   asked   to   report   the  
location   of   an   oddball   colored   target   appearing   among   an  
array  of  identically  colored  distractors.  Participants  showed  
clear  evidence  of  CP  on  this  task.  They  were  faster  to  detect  
a   difference   between   the   target   and   distractors  when   they  
came   from   different   categories   (e.g.,   blue   target,   green  
distracters).  Again,   the   critical   question   is  whether   CP   on  
the   visual   search   task   occurs   only   at   boundaries   between  
colors  in  the  putative  universal  set  or  whether  it  also  occurs  
at  boundaries  that  are  not  marked  in  English.  The  question  
has   been   answered   in   recent   studies   with   speakers   of  
Russian  (Winawer  et  al.,  2007),  and  with  speakers  of  Korean  
(Roberson,   Pak   and   Hanley,   2008).   Russian   participants  
showed  CP  at   the  boundary  between   sinii   (dark  blue)   and  
goloboy  (light  blue),  which  are  basic  color  terms  for  speakers  
of  Russian.  Korean  participants  showed  CP  at  the  boundary  
between  yeondu   (yellow-­green)  and  chorok   (green),  which  
are   basic   color   terms   for   Korean,   but   not   for   speakers   of  
English.  In  consequence,  these  two  studies  provide  evidence  
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for  superior  discrimination  of  stimuli   that  cross  a  category  
boundary   (such   as   that   found   for   English   speakers   at   the  
boundary  between  blue  and  green)  and  does  not  support  the  
view  that  there  is  a  set  of  universal  color  categories  that  are  
hard-­wired  in  the  human  visual  system.  
Thus,  in  summary,  the  cross-­cultural  results  have  indicated  
that   linguistic   training   affected   low-­level   perception   (see  
also   Goldstone,   1994).   Moreover,   the   results   uphold   the  
view   that   the   structure   of   linguistic   categories   distorts  
perception   by   stretching   perceptual   distances   at   category  
boundaries   (Goldstone,   1994;;   1998).   It  would   appear   that  
the  internal  color  space  (Davidoff,  1991;;  2001)  is  not  static;;  
some  distances  within  it  are  ‘stretched’  or  ‘distorted’  by  the  
LQÀXHQFHRIFRORUODEHOV
The   second   line   of   evidence   for   the   involvement   of  
language  concerns  experimental  studies  with  human  adults  
showing   that  categorically  controlled  performance  became  
non-­categorical   by   the   introduction   of   verbal   interference  
tasks   (Gilbert   et   al.,   2006;;   Hermer-­Vazquez,   Spelke   &  
Katsnelson,   1999;;   Roberson   &   Davidoff,   2000;;  Winawer  
et   al.,   2007).  For  example,  Roberson  and  Davidoff   (2000)  
contrasted  verbal   interference  with  visual   interference   in  a  
color   recognition   task.   Both   interference   tasks   decreased  
recognition   performance   but,   surprisingly,   the   categorical  
difference   was   retained   with   visual   interference   but  
completely  disappeared  under  verbal  interference.  
Both   lines   of   evidence   implicating   language   in   color  
FDWHJRULHV UHWXUQXV WR WKHZLGHO\KHOGYLHZRI¿IW\\HDUV
ago,  when  color  categories  were  thought  derived  from  color  
terms.  The  belief  was,  in  accord  with  the  linguistic  relativity  
hypothesis  of  Whorf   (1956)   that   “We  dissect  nature   along  
lines  laid  down  by  our  native  language”.
&RQWUDU\ WR WKH:KRU¿DQYLHZ%HUOLQ DQG.D\ 
followed  by  Rosch  Heider  and  Olivier  (1972)  argued  that  the  
perceptual/cognitive  division  of  color  space  was  universal  and  
therefore  independent  of  language.  The  universal  view  has,  
at  least  until  recently,  become  the  established  position  in  the  
¿HOGZLWKWKHLPSOLFDWLRQWKDWWKHUHDUHLQQDWHSK\VLRORJLFDO
mechanisms  underlying  color  categories.   In  support  of   the  
universalist  view,  Kay  and  McDaniel  (1978)  suggested  that  
primary  categories  (red,  green,  yellow  and  blue)  derive  from  
the  output  of  opponent-­process  cells.  These  cells  selectively  
respond   to   different   ranges   of   wavelength,   and   produce  
the  well-­known   phenomenon   of   colored   after-­images.   For  
example,   after   habituating   to   a   long   (“red”)  wavelength   a  
neutral  surface  appears  to  be  colored  green.  Although  these  
cells  might  appear  to  be  categorical,  this  is  not  the  case  (de  
Valois  &  de  Valois,  1990).  In  fact,  opponent-­process  cells  do  
not  output  categorical  information  per  se,  but  only  respond  
WR VSHFL¿F UDQJHV RI ZDYHOHQJWK 2SSRQHQWSURFHVV FHOOV
do  show  particular  wavelengths  at  which  discrimination   is  
clearly  more   sensitive,   but   these   discontinuities   are   not   at  
the  required  places  to  produce  the  boundaries  of  primary  red,  
yellow,  green  and  blue  color  categories.  Nor  do  colors  that  
we  see  as  uniquely  red,  yellow,  green  or  blue  have  any  clear  
relation   to   these   discontinuities   (Kuehni,   2004;;   Saunders  
&   van   Brakel,   1997).   In   the   same   way,   the   remarkable  
ZDYHOHQJWK VSHFL¿FLW\ IRXQG IRU VRPH QHXURQV ORFDWHG
in   the  early  visual  cortex  of   the  macaque   (Yoshioko,  Dow  
&   Vautin,   1996)   cannot   account   for   color   categories.   To  
FRPSO\ZLWK RXU GH¿QLWLRQ RI &3ZKDWZRXOG EH QHHGHG
is   to  have  neurons   that  were  more   sensitive   to  cross-­   than  
within-­category   distinctions.   To   our   knowledge,   no   such  
neurons  have  been  described  in  the  literature.  
No   better   success   is   achieved   by   trying   to   relate   color  
category  boundaries  to  spectral  sensitivities,  When  spectral  
sensitivity   thresholds   have   been  measured   along   the   color  
continuum,   the   minima   or   maxima   for   color   sensitivity  
show  no  clear  relationship  with  color  category  boundaries.  
For  example,  in  Heywood,  Cowey  and  Newcombe  (1991),  
the  minimum   threshold   in   the  green   range  was  at  525  nm  
(inferred  from  their  graphs)  and  does  not    occur  either  at  the  
location  of  the  actual  green  to  blue  boundary  (495  mm)  or  
at   the   location  of   the  green   to  yellow  boundary   (550  mn).  
A  similar  conclusion  comes  from  a  cross-­cultural  study  by  
Roberson   et   al.   (2009)   where   thresholds   and   boundaries  
were   comparatively   assessed   in   English   and   Korean  
speakers.     From   the  universalist   position,  we  are  only   left  
with   the   possibility      that   primary   color   prototypes   (foci)  
have  a  physiological  basis  (Kay  &  Regier,  2006;;  Philipona  
&  O’Regan,  2006),  but  it  would  still  be  necessary  to  show  
that   there   is   a   behavioral   consequence   restricted   only   to  
those  focal  colors,    there  was  no  such  restriction  in  Roberson  
et  al.  (2004).    
Recent  theories  of  color  categories  formation  have  rejected  
the  physiological  basis  as  the  unique  explanation,  but  suggest  
a  compromise  instead  between  the  universality  and  linguistic  
hypotheses  (e.g.,  Kay,  Regier  &  Cook,  2005).  One  the  one  
hand,   it   is   acknowledged   that   language   processing   affects  
colors  categories.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  acknowledged  that  
the  physiological  system  must  put  some  constraints  on  color  
category  formation.  For  example,  Kay  &  Regier  (2006)  point  
out  that  languages  like  Berinmo  (and  also  Himba)  divide  up  
color  space  in  very  similar  ways,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  1.  
One  may  note  that  all  the  languages  listed  in  Figure  1  have  
a  term  for  dark  colors,  one  for  light  colors,  one  for  the  “red”  
area  of  color  space,  one  for  the  “yellow”  area,  and  one  that  
encompasses  both  “blue”  and  “green”.      
Regier,   Kay   and   Khetarpal   (2007)   have   elaborated   on  
these  regularities  and  have  given  a  biological  explanations  
for  their  origin.    They  propose  that  these  optimal  partitions  
could  be  based  on  some  universal  discrimination  differences  
XVHIXOIRUWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIYHUEDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQVHHDOVR
Komorova,   Jameson   &   Narens,   2007).   However,   there  
remain   variations   across   cultures   in   color   categories   even  
when  they  have  the  same  number  of  color  terms  (Roberson  et  
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al.,  2005),  suggesting  an  additional  contribution  of  language  
on  color   categories   (see   also   Jameson  &  Alvarado,  2003).  
From  the  “relativist”  perspective,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  
optimal  solution  proposed  by  Regier  et  al.  (2007)  does  not  
provide  any  boundary  between  the  supposed  primary  colors  
of  green  and  blue.    
Before  considering  how  the  argument  might  be  examined  
LQ WKH QRQKXPDQ SULPDWH ZH ¿UVW H[DPLQH D FRXSOH RI
unresolved  issues  from  the  human  evidence  concerning  the  
role  of  language  in  the  origins  of  color  categories.
&RQWUDVWHG¿QGLQJVRQKHPLVSKHULFDV\PPHWU\
Hemispheric  asymmetry  with  respect   to  color  categories  
could  be  expected  from  the  involvement  of  language.  This  
hypothesis   is   supported   by   neuropsychological   research  
showing   that   language   impairments   produced   by   brain  
damage   may   produce   failures   in   color   categorization  
(Goldstein,  1948;;  Roberson  et  al.,  1999).  Despite  preserved  
color  vision,   in   addition   to   a   retained  ability   to   categorize  
other  stimuli,  patients  in  these  studies  failed  to  understand  the  
meaning  of  color  terms,  and  failed  to  sort  colors,  suggesting  
that  colors  do  not  automatically  form  categories  once  color  
terms  have  been  lost.    Further,  neuroimaging  studies  showed  
left  hemisphere  activations  in  known  language  areas  during  
color   comparison   tasks   (e.g.,  Siok  et   al   ,   2009;;  Tan  et   al.,  
2008;;  Thierry  et  al.,  2009).  For  example,  in  Siok  et  al  (2009)  
it  was  only  categorical  color  decisions  in  a  visual  search  task  
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that  were  accompanied  by  activation  in  language  areas.  
Again  supporting  ideas  of  hemispheric  asymmetry,  adult  
studies  using  a  visual  search  paradigm  found  that  it  was  only  
RUPDLQO\ULJKWYLVXDO¿HOGSUHVHQWDWLRQVWKDWSURGXFHGD
cross-­category   advantage   (Drivonikou,   Kay,   Regier,   Ivry,  
Gilbert,   Franklin   &   Davies,   2007;;   Gilbert   et   al.,   2006;;  
Roberson   et   al.,   2008).  When   the   left-­hemisphere   system  
was  suppressed  by  a  concurrent  task  that  prevented  access  to  
verbal  codes  in  normal  adults,  or  when  it  cannot  be  reached  
in   split-­brain  patients,   no   trace  of   categorical   organization  
remains  in  the  left  hemisphere  (Gilbert  et  al.,  2006).  These  
studies   have   been   used   to   distinguish   between   different  
hemispheric  codes  for  the  representation  of  color  differences  
(see  Roberson  et  al.,  2008).  
 ,QFRQWUDGLFWLRQ WR WKHDERYH¿QGLQJVDQRWDEOHDVSHFW
RI UHFHQW (53 VWXGLHV LV WKDW WKH\ ¿QG QR HYLGHQFH IRU
hemispheric   asymmetry   for   color   categories   (Fonteneau  
&   Davidoff,   2007;;   Holmes,   Franklin,   Clifford   &   Davies,  
2009)   .   The   same   conclusion   comes   from   a   behavioral  
study   (Danilova   &   Mollon,   2009).   It   is   clear   that   these  
hemispheric  asymmetries  require  further  research  not   least  
because   Franklin,   Drivonikou,   Bevis,   Davies,   Kay   and  
5HJLHU  IRXQG WKDW OHIW YLVXDO ¿HOG SUHVHQWDWLRQV
produced   cross-­category   advantages   in   human   infants   for  
many  color  categories.  They  therefore  argued  that  only  the  
right  hemisphere  of   the  brain  –presumably  the  right  visual  
cortex-­   is   imbued  with   innate   color   categorical  properties.  
The  results  of  Franklin  et  al.  (2008)  certainly  pose  problems  
in   understanding   the   development   of   color   categories.  
While   there   is   now   general   agreement   that   language   (left  
hemisphere)   networks   are   involved   in   the   production   of  
FRORUFDWHJRULHVLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRXQGHUVWDQGKRZWKRVHZRXOG
FRH[LVWZLWK D ULJKW KHPLVSKHUHZLWK SRVVLEO\ FRQÀLFWLQJ
innate  color  categories.  
&RQWUDVWHG¿QGLQJVRQLQIDQWFRORUFDWHJRULHV
As  well  as  the  converging  evidence  for  the  importance  of  
color  terms  in  establishing  CP  in  adult  human  populations,  
there   is   also   evidence   that   naming   draws   the   attention   of  
infants   as   young   as   9-­13   month   of   age   to   commonalities  
among   objects   and   facilitates   the   formation   of   categories  
(Plunkett,  Hu  &  Cohen,  2008;;  Waxman  &  Markow,  1995;;  
Younger,   1985).   Categorization   is   also   possible   in   even  
younger   infants   in   the  absence  of   language  (Quinn,  Eimas  
&   Rosenkrantz,   1993)   but   this   is   restricted   to   the   special  
case   of   the   categorization   of   discontinuous   stimuli   where  
say,  dogs  vs.  cats,  can  be  distinguished  simply  by  features  
(French,  Mareschal,  Mermillod  &  Quinn,  2004).  However,  
there  are  several  reports  showing  color  categorization  to  be  
present  as  early  as  4  months  (Bornstein,  Kessen  &  Weiskopf,  
1976;;  Franklin  &  Davies,  2004;;  Franklin,  Pilling  &  Davies,  
2005;;  Franklin  et  al.,  2008).  These  studies  give  a  powerful  
argument  in  favor  of  innate  mechanisms,  and  hence  in  favor  
of  the  universal  color  categories  proposed  by  Berlin  and  Kay  
(1969).  In  their  classic  study,  Bornstein  et  al.  (1976)  showed  
novelty   preference   for   a   stimulus   from   a   different   color  
category  but  not  from  the  same  category.  The  study  used  a  
habituation-­dishabituation   paradigm   testing   dishabituation  
for   either   between-­category   or   within-­category   spectral  
sources.  The  result  showed  greater  dishabituation  for  cross-­
category  stimuli.  
Doubts   were   raised   at   the   time   about   the   methodology  
in   Bornstein’s   studies   (Banks   &   Salapatek,   1983;;  Werner  
&   Wooten,   1985).   Cross-­and   within-­category   distances  
were   measured   simply   by   wavelength   differences.   From  
this  procedure,  one  cannot  claim  for  example  that  a  450nm  
(blue)  and  510nm  (green)  stimuli  are  equally  different  from  a  
480nm  training  stimulus.  The  more  recent  studies  have  used  
more   appropriately   spaced   Munsell   stimuli   but   obtained  
essentially  the  same  results  as  Bornstein  et  al.  (1976).  Indeed,  
in  Franklin  and  Davies  (2004),  CP  was  found  in  4-­month-­
olds  between  secondary  as  well  as  between  primary  colors,  in  
places  where  even  universalist  theories  (e.g.,  Kay  &  Regier,  
ZRXOGQRWSUHGLFWWKHP7KHUHLVDFRQWUDU\¿QGLQJRI
Gerhardstein,  Renner  and  Rovee-­Collier  (1999),  but  Davies  
and  Franklin  (2002)  contend  that  the  paper’s  conclusions  are  
unsafe  due  to  unintended  category  boundaries.  
Franklin   et   al.   (2005,   2008)   used  visual   search   to   study  
color   categorization   but   this   methodology   has   its   own  
problems.  In  testing  infants,  Franklin  et  al.  (2008)  used  only  
3  widely-­separated  colors  (one  green  and  one  blue  target  and  
a   background   color   that  was   just   on   the   green   side   of   the  
boundary  between  green  and  blue),  because  those  used  for  
DGXOWVZHUHWRRGLI¿FXOWIRULQIDQWVWRGLVFULPLQDWH7KXVQR
direct  comparison  with  adults  can  be  made  because  the  adults  
in  the  study  saw  a  different  set  of  colors.    Furthermore,  given  
WKH GLI¿FXOWLHV RI FDUU\LQJ RXW H\HWUDFNLQJ VWXGLHV ZLWK
infants,   the  data  came  from  only  13  infants.  Nor  have  any  
infants  to-­date  been  tested  for  the  presence  of  other  category  
boundaries  (such  as  that  between  the  Russian  categories  sinii  
and  goloboy)  that  are  not  proposed  to  be  part  of  any  universal  
innate  set.  It  is  therefore  premature  to  conclude  that  all  pre-­
linguistic   infants   show   the   same   pattern   of   categorization  
as  (English-­speaking)  adults  across  the  full  range  of  visible  
FRORUV7KHLUFRQFOXVLRQDOVRVWDQGVDWRGGVZLWKWKH¿QGLQJV
of   Xu   and   Carey   (2000)   where   6-­months-­of   age   children  
were  found  to  be  insensitive  to  much  larger  changes  in  the  
color  of  stimuli  than  used  by  Franklin  et  al.  (2008).  
For   a   strong   relativist   position   on   the   origin   of   color  
categories   (Davidoff,   2001)   these   infant   data   are   hard   to  
accommodate.   If   color   category   divisions   are   established  
through  language,  one  would  not  expect  any  evidence  for  CP  
before   the   acquisition   of   color   terms.  However,  Bornstein  
 UHFRJQL]HG WKDW VRPH GLI¿FXOWLHV DULVH IURP WKH
SURSRVDORI LQQDWH FRORU FDWHJRULHV7KH¿UVW LV H[SODLQLQJ
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WKH ZHOONQRZQ GLI¿FXOW\ FKLOGUHQ KDYH LQ OHDUQLQJ FRORU
names.  If  the  physiological  apparatus  is  already  in  place  at  
4  months,   it   seems  odd   that   it   takes  another  18  months   to  
OHDUQ WKH¿UVW FRORUZRUGGXULQJ WKH WLPH WKH FKLOG VKRZV
a   spurt   of  word   learning.  Bornstein   (1985)   suggested   that  
there  must  be  some  maturational  delay  perhaps  of  callosal  
¿EHUVDSURSRVDOWKDWGRHVQRWH[SODLQWKHGUDPDWLFLQFUHDVH
in  the  acquisition  of  color  terms  of  present  day  4-­year-­olds  
compared  to  those  of  100  years  ago.  Bornstein  (1985)  was  
also  aware   that  a  color  vision  system  in   line  with  Western  
color   terms  would,   if   innate,   pose   problems   for   the  many  
languages   in   the   world   that   did   not   possess   these   terms.  
&KLOGUHQLQWKRVHODQJXDJHVRXJKWWR¿QGFRORUQDPLQJHYHQ
PRUHGLI¿FXOW7KXV WKH LQIDQWGDWDSUHVHQWDFKDOOHQJH WR
researchers  who  maintain  a  relativist  position  for   the  issue  
of  color  categorization.    
([SHULPHQW&RPSDUDWLYHDVVHVVPHQWRIFRORUWKUHVKROGV
LQKXPDQVDQGEDERRQV
A   consequence   of   language   involvement   in   learning  
color  categories  could  be  that  they  are  restricted  to  humans.  
However,   a   different   prediction   is   offered   by   Notman,  
Sowden   and  Özgen   (2005)   from   the  CP   in   their   study   on  
learned  orientation  categories.  They  argued  for  a  change  to  
neural  sensitivity  at  V1.  Notman  et  al.   (2005)   investigated  
discrimination  thresholds  for  orientation  category  boundaries.  
They  taught  human  participants  to  distinguish  between  two  
categories  of  45°  Gabor  patterns  each  composed  of  gratings  
that  differed  by  spatial  phase.  Their  learned  category  showed  
an  enhanced  sensitivity  at  the  category  boundary  in  a  same/
different   discrimination   task.  The   enhanced   sensitivity  did  
not  generalize  to  a  90°  change  of  orientation,  only  applied  
to  a  narrow  orientation  bandwidth  estimated  to  be  6.5°,  and  
was  restricted  to  the  retinal  locus  of  stimulation.  From  these  
data,  Notman   et   al.   (2005)   reasonably   argue   that   category  
learning  has  changed  perceptual  sensitivity  probably  at  V1.  
But,   as   Fahle   (2004)   notes,   enhanced   sensitivity   for   such  
a   narrow  bandwidth   is   an   improbable   basis   for   perceptual  
categorization  as  we  would  need  to  learn  to  categorize  the  
same  stimuli  separately  at  many  different  orientations.  The  
VDPHZRXOGDSSO\WRWKHVSHFL¿FLW\RIUHWLQDOORFDWLRQ)RU
other  reasons,  Mollon  and  Danilova  (1996)  have  also  warned  
against  interpreting  data  similar  to  Notman  et  al.  (2005)  as  
necessarily  implying  the  lack  of  cognitive  intervention.  
In  a  recent  paper,  Roberson  et  al.  (2009)  explicitly  tested  
whether  there  was  an  increase  in  sensitivity  at  color  category  
boundaries  as  would  be  predicted  by  the  approach  taken  by  
Notman   et   al.   (2005).   They   examined   a   blue-­green   range  
that   contained   category   boundaries   for   both   English   and  
Korean  speakers.  The  boundaries  are  at  different  points  for  
speakers  of  the  two  languages  as  the  color  terms  are  different  
in   English   and   Korean.   However,   neither   language   group  
showed  enhanced  sensitivity  at  either  of  the  two  boundaries.  
Comparative  data  could  speak  to  this  issue  because  if  color  
categories  were  innate  and  produced  from  neurons  at  early  
visual  cortex,  one  ought  to  see  threshold  differences  at  color  
boundaries  for  all  species  with  our  trichromatic  vision.  We  
examine  this  issue  in  Experiment  1  and  subsequently  consider  
the  issue  of  CP  in  non-­human  primates  in  Experiment  2.
Experiment  1  assessed   threshold  values   for   the   range  of  
colors  used  in  Roberson  et  al.  (2009),  but  with  a  non-­human  
primate  species.  If  category  boundaries  are  associated  with  
HQKDQFHG VHQVLWLYLW\ RQH RXJKW WR ¿QG ORZHUHG WKUHVKROG
around  495  nm  for  spectral  stimuli  and  close  to  7.5BG  when  
using  the  Munsell  system  (Roberson  et  al.,  1999).
0HWKRG
3DUWLFLSDQWV
They  were  two  Guinea  baboons  (Papio  papio)  who  lived  
at   the   CNRS   (Marseille)   and   two   young   human   female  
adults.  The  baboons  had  already  taken  part  in  many  different  
experiments   using   the   matching-­to-­sample   procedure   and  
joystick   computerized   systems   (e.g.,   Fagot,   Goldstein,  
Davidoff  &  Pickering,  2006).  
$SSDUDWXV
The   experiment   took   place   in   a   darkened   room.   The  
baboons  were  tested  in  an  experimental  enclosure  (60  x  50  
x  72  cm)  facing  a  joystick,  a  metal  touch  pad,  and  a  14-­inch  
color  monitor.  On   the   front  of   the  enclosure  were  a  view-­
port,  a  hand-­port,  and  a   food  dispenser  delivering  banana-­
ÀDYRUHGIRRGSHOOHWVLQWRWKHHQFORVXUH0DQLSXODWLRQRIWKH
joystick   induced   isomorphic   displacements   of   a   cursor   on  
the  monitor.  The  eye/screen  distance  was  approximately  49  
cm.  
For  humans,   the  monitor   and   joystick  were  placed  on   a  
table   so   that   viewing   distance   remained   equal   to   49   cm.  
Control   and   randomization   of   conditions   were   achieved  
through  purpose-­made  programs  written   in  E-­Prime  V  1.0  
(Psychology   Software   Tools,   Inc).   Color   calibration   was  
achieved   as   in  Roberson   and  Davidoff   (2000).  Accuracies  
and  latencies  were  recorded.
3URFHGXUH
Discrimination   thresholds   were   measured   with   an  
adaptive  staircase  procedure  (Levitt,  1971)  leading  to  a  rapid  
convergence  near  the  asymptotic  threshold  level.  Thresholds  
were  obtained  in  separate  blocks  for  the  following  reference  
(sample)   stimuli:   7.5G-­10G-­2.5BG-­5BG-­7.5BG-­10BG-­
2.5B-­5B,   avoiding   the   training   stimuli   used   in   Fagot   et  
al.   (2006).   The   same   sample   stimulus   was   systematically  
Color  Categories   72
employed  in  all  trials  of  a  single  session.  All  stimuli  were  of  
constant  brightness  (Value  5),  saturation  (Chroma  6)  and  of  
6.4°  by  6.4°  visual  angle.
Each  trial  started  with  the  display  of  a  .5°  circular  green  
cursor   along  with   a  white   .5°x.5°   square-­shaped   stimulus,  
located  1.5°  above  or  below  the  cursor.  In  response  to  this  
display,   the   participant   had   to   place   the   green   dot   on   the  
white  square  so  as  to  initiate  the  trial.  Once  done,  the  sample  
stimulus  was  displayed  at  random  on  the  left  or  right  of  the  
screen  for  500  msec  and  was  immediately  followed  by  a  pair  
of  stimuli  arranged  vertically  on  the  mid-­line  of  the  screen.  
One  of  the  stimuli  was  identical  to  the  sample.  The  task  was  
to  point  with  the  cursor  to  the  stimulus  matching  the  sample.  
Baboons  received  a  short  inter-­trial  interval  (ITI)  of  1  second  
and   a   food   pellet   inside   the   enclosure   in   case   of   correct  
response.   When   their   response   choices   were   erroneous,  
responses  were  followed  by  a   three  second  timeout  during  
which  the  screen  remained  black.  For  humans,  the  feedback  
consisted  of  a  short  ITI  for  a  correct  response,  and  a  three  
second  timeout  for  an  incorrect  choice.
The  session  started  with   trials  having  a  high  probability  
of  positive  response.   In   these  early   trials,   the  foil  was   two  
Munsell   steps   different   from   the   sample.  When   a   run   of  
three  positive  responses  was  obtained,  the  next  trial  reduced  
the  match/foil  color  difference  by  1/20th  of  a  Munsell  step.  
When   a   single   negative   response   was   obtained,   the   color  
difference  was   increased  by  1/20th  of  a  Munsell  step.  The  
SURFHGXUHFRQWLQXHGXQWLO UHYHUVDOV GH¿QHGDVHLWKHUD
color   difference   increment   or   color   difference   decrement)  
were   obtained;;   this   compares   favorably   to   most   other  
usage   of   the   staircase   procedure   (Garcia-­Pérez,   1998).  
Humans  received  three  series  of   test  sessions  with  each  of  
the  eight  possible  sample  colors.  Baboons  received  6  series  
with   each   sample   color.  The   order   of   color   testing  within  
a   series   was   randomized.   For   baboons,   the   test   sessions  
lasted  approximately  from  200  to  350  trials.  Humans  often  
reached   the   asymptotic   discrimination   level   more   quickly  
than  baboons,  and  needed  from  150  to  200  trials  to  perform  
a  session.  The  total  testing  time  was  thus  of  approximately  
12,000  trials  for  each  baboon  and  4,800  for  humans.
5HVXOWV
7KH LQFUHPHQW WKUHVKROGVZHUHGH¿QHG IRUHDFKVDPSOH
color,   as   the  minimal   average  color  difference  obtained   in  
any  run  of  8  consecutive   reversals   in  any  session  (Garcia-­
Pérez,  1998).  In  the  context  of  very  low  thresholds  for  both  
species,  there  was  generally  superior  performance  from  the  
baboons  (see  Figure  2).  Thus,  on  average  for  the  8  sample  
colors,  discrimination  thresholds  for  the  two  baboons  were  
)LJXUH'LVFULPLQDWLRQWKUHVKROGVLQKXPDQVDQGEDERRQVDVDIXQFWLRQRIWKHVDPSOHVWLPXOXVFRORU
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of  .29  (baboon  2)  and  .34  (baboon  1)  Munsell  steps.  It  was  
of  .48  Munsell  steps  for  each  of  the  two  human  participants.  
Correlations   between   the   thresholds   were   extremely   high  
DQG VLJQL¿FDQWZLWKLQ VSHFLHV KXPDQV r   =   .99;;   baboons:  
r  =  .93)  and  between  individuals  from  the  two  species  (range  
of  rs  :  .81-­.89).  In  addition,  each  baboon  indicated  a  lower  
discrimination   threshold   than   the   humans   (two-­tailed   pair  
t-­tests,   all   ps   <   .02).   Regardless   of   these   similarities   and  
differences,  it  is  clear  from  Figure  2  that  there  is  no  evidence  
for  superior  sensitivity  at  the  category  boundary  in  the  region  
of  7.5BG.
'LVFXVVLRQ
Our   study   allowed   two   conclusions.   First,   in   spite   of  
lower  discriminations  thresholds  in  baboons  than  in  humans,  
baboons   show   the   same  pattern  of   results   as  humans  with  
similar   threshold   variations   along   the   color   continuum.  
Second,   in   line   with   Roberson   et   al.   (2009),   there   is   no  
evidence   from   either   human   or   baboon   for   an   enhanced  
sensitivity   at   the   known   human   green/blue   color   (i.e.,  
7.5BG)  boundary.  Therefore  it  seems  safe  to  conclude  that  
categorical   similarity   in   color   appearance   can   not   derive  
from   a   differential   threshold   sensitivity   at   the   boundary.  
Nevertheless,  humans  have  sharp  color  category  boundaries  
(e.g.,  Fagot  et  al.,  2006)  and  one  may  ask  how  that  comes  
about  if  it  is  not  a  result  of  threshold  differences.
An   important   feature   of   categorical   color   judgments   is  
that  they  are  invoked  automatically  (Fonteneau  &  Davidoff,  
2007;;   Holmes   et   al.,   2009;;   Tan   et   al.,   2008;;   Thierry   et  
al.,   2009)   and   even   in   a   patient  who   has   lost   color   terms  
(Roberson   et   al.,   1999).      For   example,   Fonteneau   and  
Davidoff  (2007)  found  that  ERP  activity  to  a  color  presented  
LQDVHULHVRIFRORUVUHÀHFWHGLWVFDWHJRU\UHODWLRQVKLSWRWKH
other  colors.  The  ERP  was  categorical  despite  no  response  
being  made  to  the  color  and  observers  not  even  realizing  that  
any  aspect  of  color  was  under  investigation.  The  categorical  
response  was  early  in  the  ERP  trace  but  even  earlier  (i.e.,  P1)  
components  have  been  recently  claimed  for  color  categories  
(Holmes   et   al.,   2009;;   Thierry   et   al.,   2009).   Given   the  
activation  of  language  areas  in  color  judgments,  these  recent  
ERP  studies  suggesting  categorical  activity  in  (extra)striate  
cortical   areas   would   appear   to   require   a   rapid   activation  
of   feedback  networks  during  color  processing   (Siok  et  al.,  
2009).   Presumably,   these   feedback   loops   are   disrupted   by  
concurrent   verbal   activity   (Gilbert   et   al.,   2006;;   Roberson  




Given  such  clear  implication  for  language  in  human  color  
CP,   we   examined   the   cross-­species   research   that   might  
lead   one   to   believe   that   non-­humans   also   demonstrate  CP  
IRUFRORUV+HUUQVWHLQDQG/RYHODQGZHUHWKH¿UVWWR
demonstrate   that  an  animal  species  (i.e.,   the  pigeon)  could  
learn   to   sort   visual   stimuli   on   a   categorical   basis.   In   their  
study,   pigeons   learned   to   provide   behavioral   responses  
consistent  with  the  categorical  structure  of  the  stimuli  and,  
even   more   impressively,   generalized   to   novel,   previously  
unseen   exemplars   of   the   categories.   Since   Herrnstein   and  
Loveland   (1964),   categorization   has   been   demonstrated  
in   a   variety   of   species   and  with   a   variety   of   experimental  
procedures   (D’Amato   &   van   Sant,   1988;;   Dépy,   Fagot   &  
Vauclair,  1997;;  Fagot,  Wasserman  &  Young,  2001;;  Martin-­
Malivel   &   Fagot,   2001).   While   these   studies   show   that  
some   forms  of   categorization   are  possible   in   animals,   and  
consequently  that  language  might  not  be  necessary  condition  
for   categorization,   the   cognitive   procedures   permitting  
those   categorical   responses   still   remain   largely   unclear.   It  
is   particularly   unclear   in  which   context   the   animals   solve  
the   task  by  way  of  procedures,   such  as   feature  analysis  or  
prototype   learning,   implying   an   analysis   of   the   physical  
dimensions   of   the   stimuli,   and   when   they   rely   on   more  
abstract  thought.  
Among   the   possible   reasons   limiting   the   heuristic  
values   of   categorical   studies   in   animals   is   the   general   use  
RI QRQFRQWLQXRXV YDULDEOHV WR GH¿QH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ
categories.  For  example,   studies  have   tested   the  capability  
of  animals  to  discriminate  between  categories  such  as  tree,  
monkey   or   people   (e.g.,   Herrnstein   &   Loveland,   1964).  
Use   of   these   types   of   categorical   structures  makes   it   very  
hard   to   identify   the   cognitive   procedure   employed   by   the  
animals   to   solve   the   task,   partly   because   the   stimuli   are  
multidimensional,  and  therefore  to  make  conclusions  about  
the  level  of  abstractness  achieved  by  the  subjects.
Notable  exceptions  for  the  use  of  non  continuous  variables  
with  animal  species  are  the  studies  on  CP  of  auditory  stimuli  
in  chinchillas  and  monkeys  (e.g.,  May,  Moody  &  Stebbins,  
1989;;  Ohlemiller,  Jones,  Hedibreder,  Clarck  &  Miller,  1999).  
Most  of  these  authors  consider  the  Voice  Onset  Time  (VOT)  
as   the   critical   variable   in   their   studies.   VOT   corresponds  
to   the   interval   between   consonant   onset   and   the   start   of  
rhythmic   vocal-­cord   vibrations.   Perception   of   consonants  
such   as   /d/   and   /t/   appear   indeed   categorical   in   humans,  
with  a  boundary  lying  at  a  VOT  of  20-­40  ms.  Note  however  
that  boundaries   in  perceptual  categorization  studies  do  not  
always  converge  between  humans  and  nonhuman  primates,  
suggesting  that  this  effect  is  not  purely  perceptual  (e.g.,  /ra-­
la/  contrast:  Sinnott  &  Brown,  1997).
Application  of  the  VOT  paradigm  has  suggested  that  the  
discrimination   of   such   auditory   stimuli   is   also   categorical  
in  animals   (e.g.,  May  et  al.,  1989;;  Ohlemiller  et  al.,  1999;;  
Steinchneider,   Fishman   &   Arezzo,   2003),   and   therefore  
that   there   is   no   need   of   language   for  CP.  This   conclusion  
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might  however  be  premature  for  the  following  three  reasons.  
First,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  stimuli  employed  in  VOT  
paradigms  are  not  unidimensional,  as  they  vary  in  a  number  
of  dimensions,  such  as  spectral,  temporal,  or  overall  energy.  
,W LV WKHUHIRUHGLI¿FXOW WRDVFHUWDLQZLWK WKLVSURFHGXUH WKH
actual  mechanism  at   the  origin  of  CP  effects.  Listeners   in  
VOT   studies   were   noticeably   found   to   attend   to   different  
phonemic  cues  (Ohlemiller  et  al.,  1999),  therefore  opening  
the  possibility  that  different  cognitive  procedures  might  be  
applied  by  participants  with  VOT  procedures.  Second,  not  all  
experiments  could  demonstrate  CP  with  the  VOT  procedure  
(e.g.,   Hopp,   Sinnot,   Owren   &   Petersen,   1992).   Third,   it  
remains  possible  that  the  stimuli  used  by  these  researchers  
are  of  special  ecological  value  for  the  animals,  and  therefore  
that  CP  would  not  necessarily  generalize  to  other  continua  
of  stimuli.  
Other   evidence   for   CP   in   animals   has   resulted   from  
categorization  studies  using  unidimensional  visual   stimuli.  
Thus,   Wilson   and   Debauche   (1981)   tested   CP   of   length,  
orientation   and   texture   in   macaques.   After   training   with  
the  extremes  of  a  set  of  stimuli,  category  boundaries  were  
LGHQWL¿HG IRU HDFK GLPHQVLRQ DV WKH VWLPXOXV HOLFLWLQJ
50   choices   over   all   comparisons.   After   training,   normal  
macaques  (in  comparison  with  animals  with  inferotemporal  
lesions)   had   improved   discrimination   performance  
for   between-­category   compared   to   within-­category  
discrimination.  However,   inspection  of   individual  monkey  
data  does  not  show  clear  categorization  responses.
Very   few   studies   (Fagot   et   al.,   2006;;   Matsuno,   Kawai  
&   Matsuzawa,   2004;;   Matsuzawa,   1985;;   Sandell,   Gross  
&   Bornstein,   1979)   have   assessed   color   categorization   in  
primates  such  as  the  chimpanzee  or  the  baboon,  despite  that  
they  are  known  to  have  the  same  wavelength  discrimination  
function   as   humans   (Bowmaker,   Astell,   Hunt   &   Mollon,  
1991;;   Bowmaker,   Mollon   &   Jacobs,   1983).   The   lack   of  
research  might   be   due   to   the  widespread   belief   that   color  
categories  are  universal  in  the  human  (Berlin  &  Kay,  1969)  
and   therefore   should   be   present   in   all   primates.  A   further  
disinclination   to   investigate   color   categories   could   be   that  
it   has   already   been   thought   shown   in   the   chimpanzee  Ai  
(Matsuzawa,  1985).  Ai,  after  being   trained   to  use  symbols  
to   name   the   so-­called   11   basic   colors,   generalized   these  
names   to  other   colors  much   in   the  way  one  would   expect  
of   a  Western   or   Japanese   speaker.  However,   there  was   no  
evidence  that  such  generalization  would  be  possible   in   the  
DEVHQFHRIVSHFL¿FWUDLQLQJ,QGHHGWKHVHFDWHJRULHVGRQRW
even  seem  to  be  well-­formed  in  a  chimpanzee  with  two  years  
of  experience  with  color  symbols  (Matsuno  et  al.,  2004).  The  
most  recent  investigation  of  color  categories  in  the  monkey  
(Fagot  et  al.,  2006)  could  also  be  judged  inconclusive.  
Fagot  et  al.  (2006)  trained  baboons  to  match  color  patches  
from   the   green-­blue   continuum.   In   the   training   phase,   the  
baboons  were   required   to   only  match   the   extremes   of   the  
continuum,  namely  the  2.5G  and  10B  stimuli.  In  the  transfer  
test,  they  were  requested  to  match  the  intermediate  stimuli  
with  one  of  the  two  extremes  of  the  continuum,  for  instance  
match   the   10G   stimulus  with   the   2.5G   stimulus.   Figure   3  
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results   obtained   in   baboons   with   those   of   a   group   of   8  
humans  tested  in  the  same  conditions.  A  visual  inspection  of  
Figure  3  promptly  reveals  that  humans  expressed  a  clear-­cut  
boundary  in  that  continuum.  The  boundary  corresponded  to  
the  one  obtained  when  asked  to  name  the  stimuli  as  being  
green  or  blue.  There  was  by  contrast  no  such  boundary   in  
baboons,   in   other  words,   they  process   the   continuum  as   a  
continuum,  contrary  to  humans  who  process  the  stimuli  as  
EHORQJLQJWRWZRFOHDUO\GH¿QHGJUHHQDQGEOXHFDWHJRULHV
However,   as   pointed   out   in   several   studies   with   human  
observers,   the   matching   to   sample   (MTS)   procedure   can  
SURGXFH DUWL¿FLDO FDWHJRULHV QRW UHODWHG WR D SHUFHSWXDO
decision   (Angeli,   Davidoff   &   Valentine,   2008;;   Massaro,  
1987;;  McKone,  Martini  &  Nakayama,  2001;;  Viviani,  Binda  
&  Borsato,  2007).    So,  while  the  absence  of  clearly  delimited  
color  categories  in  the  baboon  shows  a  difference  to  humans,  
one   cannot   be   sure   that   the   difference   is   essentially   one  
related  to  color  categorization.
The   one   published   attempt   to   show   CP   for   colors   in  
nonhuman   primates   using   a   method   that   could   give   a  
GH¿QLWLYH DQVZHU ZDV E\ 6DQGHOO HW DO  +RZHYHU
there  are  concerns  regarding  the  stimuli  used  in  their  study.  
The  stimuli  were  derived  from  those  used  in  Bornstein  et  al.  
(1976)  where  separation  was  based  on  wavelength  differences  
rather   than   psychologically   equal   interval   steps   between  
colors.  When  Sandell  et  al.  (1979)  turned  to  monkeys,  they  
correctly  changed  from  spectral  to  Munsell  stimuli  but,  still  
having  in  mind  wavelength  differences,  got  the  separations  
wrong.   They   made   the   cross-­category   comparisons  
substantially   easier   than   the  within-­category   comparisons.  
In  fact,  their  within-­category  stimuli  were  only  5.23  Munsell  
steps  apart  on  average  whereas  the  between  category-­stimuli  
were  considerably  greater  (18.7  on  average).  Thus,  Sandell  
et  al.’s  (1979)  conclusion  of  categorical  color  perception  in  
monkeys  warrants  serious  reconsideration.  
We   conducted   an   experiment   to   further   investigate   CP  
of   colors   in   humans   and  monkeys,   using   a   procedure   that  
directly  compared  cross-­  and  within-­category  pairs.  CP  was  
therefore   studied   in   a   group   of   6   Guinea   baboons   (Papio  





  Four  male  and  two  female  baboons  of  approximately  16  
years,  which  were  already  familiar  with  the  MTS  procedure  
(e.g.,  Fagot  &  Deruelle,  1997,  2002),  were  employed  in  our  
research  on  CP.  Eight  English-­speaking  humans  (3  male,  5  
female)   aged   between   19-­27   years   (mean   age   21.6   years)  
were  paid  for  their  participation  in  the  study  at  Goldsmiths,  
University  of  London.  All  were  found  to  have  normal  color  
vision  on  the  Ishihara  plates  (Ishihara,  1998).
6WLPXOL
  As   these   animals   had   taken   part   in   the  MTS   study   of  
Fagot  et  al.  (2006)  and  are  known  to  have  a  prodigious  visual  
memory   (Fagot  &  Cook,   2006),  we  used   a  different   color  
range  to  the  blue/green  used  in  Fagot  et  al.  (2006).    Four  pairs  
of   stimuli  were   generated   comprising   two   cross-­boundary  
pairs  and  two  within-­color  pairs,  equally  spaced  in  Munsell  
steps   (Munsell,   1905)   around   the   blue/purple   boundary  
at   10PB   (Franklin   &   Davies,   2004).   The   cross-­boundary  
pairs  were  (8PB  &  1P)  and  (9PB  &  2P).  The  within-­color  
pairs  were  (5P  &  8P)  and  (2PB  &  5PB).  All  stimuli  were  of  
constant  brightness  (Value  2)  and  saturation  (Chroma  8)  and  
subtended  6.4º  x  6.4º  visual  angle,  and  were  generated  and  
calibrated  on  screen  using  a  Minolta  CS100  color  gun.
3URFHGXUH
  Each  trial  started  with  the  display  of  a  .5°  circular  green  
cursor   along   with   a   white   .5°x.5°   square-­shaped   stimulus  
on   the   screen,   located   1.5°   above   or   below   the   cursor.  
In   response   to   this   display,   the   animal   participant   had   to  
manipulate  the  joystick  in  order  to  place  the  green  dot  on  the  
white  square  so  as  to  initiate  the  trial;;  then  a  square-­shaped  
sample   stimulus   appeared  with   4.5°   of   lateral   eccentricity  
on   the   right  or   the   left  of   the  screen.  The  sample  stimulus  
was   displayed   for   500  ms   and   immediately   replaced   by   a  
display   comprising   a   cursor   and   two  patches   of   color   one  
of  which  was  identical  to  the  preceding  sample.  In  balanced  
order,  one  color  square  appeared  on  the  top  and  the  other  on  
the  bottom  half  of   the  screen.  During   the   response  period,  
participants  had  to  point  with  the  cursor  to  the  comparison  
stimulus  matching  the  sample.  There  was  no  time  limit  for  
responding.   Response   choices   and   response   times   were  
recorded.  Baboons   received  a   short   ITI  of  1   second  and  a  
food  pellet  inside  the  enclosure  in  case  of  correct  response.  
When  their  response  choices  were  erroneous,  responses  were  
followed  by  a  three  second  timeout  during  which  the  screen  
remained   black.   For   humans,   the   feedback   consisted   of   a  
short  ITI  for  a  correct  response,  and  a  three  second  timeout  
for  an  incorrect  choice.  
The   testing   consisted   of   three   sessions   of   64   randomly  
ordered  trials  for  each  participant,  using  the  stimulus  pairs  
5P   –   8P   and   2PB   -­   5PB   for  within-­category   comparisons,  
and   the   stimulus   pairs   8PB   -­   1P   and   9PB   -­   2P   for   cross-­
category  comparisons.  All   stimuli  were  used  equally  often  
as  sample  and  comparison,  and  their  location  on  the  screen  
was   completely  balanced.  Prior   to   testing,   the  participants  
from   the   two   species   received   16   randomly   ordered   and  
differentially   reinforced   training   trials   using   two   colors  
(green  and  yellow)  different  from  the  test  colors.  These  trials  
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were  repeated  until  subjects  reached  a  criterion  level  of  80%  
correct.  
The   basic   procedure   was   identical   for   the   human  
participants   except   that   the   joystick   was   replaced   by   a  
response  box  with  two  buttons  arranged  vertically  to  direct  
the  cursor  either  ‘up’  or  ‘down’.  
5HVXOWV
Trials  associated  with  latencies  less  than  150  ms  or  greater  
than  4  sec  (less  than  1%  of  the  total  number  of  trials)  were  
RPLWWHGIURPVWDWLVWLFDODQDO\VHVEHFDXVHWKH\OLNHO\UHÀHFW
anticipation  or  inattention.  Only  correct  responses  were  used  
in  the  latency  analysis  for  both  species.  The  average  baboon  
performance  collapsed  over  category  was  58.56%,  and  the  
average  human  performance  was  higher  at  80.07%.  Baboons  
responded  in  1156  ms  on  average,  humans  were  faster  with  
an  average  response  time  of  666  ms.  Response  times  were  
log  transformed  prior  to  statistical  analyses  (see  Figure  4).  
Application   of   a   Species   (baboons,   humans)   by   Category  
(within,   between)  ANOVA   on   transformed   response   time  
UHYHDOHG D VLJQL¿FDQW HIIHFW RI 6SHFLHV F(1,12)   =   35.83,  
pDVLJQL¿FDQWHIIHFWRI&DWHJRU\F(1,12)  =  13.90,  
pDQGDVLJQL¿FDQW6SHFLHVE\&DWHJRU\LQWHUDFWLRQ
F(1,12)  =  23.45,  p  <  .001.  Analysis  of  this  interaction  with  
a  Tukey  HSD  test  indicated  that  mean  response  times  were  
reliably   shorter   for   humans   in   cross-­   compared   to  within-­
category  trials  (log  RT  for  cross  =  6.36,  for  within  =  6.61,  
p   +RZHYHU WKHUH ZDV QR VLJQL¿FDQW GLIIHUHQFH
between   cross-­   or   within-­category   response   times   for   the  
baboons  (log  RT  for  cross  =  7.05,  for  within  =  7.01).  
Accuracy  scores  were  also  submitted  to  an  ANOVA  again  
using   the   Species   (baboons,   humans)   as   between-­subject  
factor   and   the   Category   (within,   cross)   as   within-­subject  
IDFWRU$JDLQ VHH)LJXUH WKHUHZDV D VLJQL¿FDQW HIIHFW
of  Species,  F(1,12)  =  115.86,  p DVLJQL¿FDQWHIIHFW
of  Category,  F(1,12)  =  115.05,  p  DQGD VLJQL¿FDQW
interaction  between  Species  and  Category,  F(1,12)  =  56.89,  
p   <   .001.  Analysis   of   this   interaction   with   a   Tukey   HSD  
WHVW LQGLFDWHG WKDW DFFXUDFLHVZHUH VLJQL¿FDQWO\ KLJKHU IRU
humans  in  cross-­  compared  to  within-­category  trials  (mean  
cross  accuracy  =  97.88%,  mean  within  accuracy  =  62.25%,  
p   +RZHYHU WKHUH ZDV QR VLJQL¿FDQW GLIIHUHQFH
between   categories   for   the   baboons   (mean   cross   accuracy  
=  61.66%,  mean  within  accuracy  =  55.47,  p  >  .15).  Further,  
the   baboon   performance   in   either   category   did   not   differ  
from   the   human   within-­category   performance   (p   =   .997  
compared  to  baboon  cross-­category  and  p  =  .098  compared  
to   baboon   within-­category).   Paired   t-­tests   showed   that  
EDERRQVSHUIRUPHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\DERYHFKDQFHLQERWKFURVV
and  within-­categories,  t(5)  =  3.33,  p  <  .03  and  t(5)  =  3.02,  
p  <  .03  respectively.  
'LVFXVVLRQ
The  experiment  produced  a  clear  cross-­species  difference  
in  CP.  It  was  only  the  humans  that  showed  the  cross-­category  
advantage.  We  note   that   the  baboons  did  not  perform  well  
)LJXUH1DWXUDOORJ57IRUEDERRQVDQGKXPDQVIRUFURVVDQGZLWKLQFDWHJRU\SDLUVXVLQJWKHEOXHSXUSOHERXQGDU\
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at   the   recognition   memory   task   though   they   were   above  
chance.  However,  that  poor  performance  needs  to  be  seen  in  
comparison  to  the  equally  poor  performance  of  the  humans  for  
the  within-­category  pairs.  Indeed,  poor  human  performance  
in  the  within-­category  condition  is  the  norm  in  our  studies  
(Roberson  &  Davidoff,  2000).    Clearly  it  is  some  aspect  of  
the  cross-­category  comparison   that  produces   the  enhanced  
performance   for   humans.   The   advantage   could   be   simply  
attributed  to  labelling  (Munnich  &  Landauer,  2003)  but  this  
is  unlikely  because  visual  search  paradigms  (Daoutis  et  al.  
2006;;  Gilbert  et  al.,  2006)  that  have  no  memory  component  
produce  equivalent  cross-­category  advantages  to  the  2AFC  
SDUDGLJP$OO LQ DOO RXU ¿QGLQJV VXJJHVW VWURQJ KXPDQ
monkey   differences   in   the   processing   of   color   categories.  
In   line   with   the   argument   presented   in   introduction,   that  





We   do   not   know   whether   baboons   might   acquire   color  
categories  with  training.  Humans  can  acquire  color  categories  
even   without   overt   naming   (Özgen   &   Davies,   2002),   but  
there   has   been   no   attempt   to   so   train  monkeys.  Although  
WKH ¿QGLQJV LQ0DWVX]DZD  VXJJHVW VLPLODU KXPDQ
FKLPSDQ]HH FRORU FODVVL¿FDWLRQV WKH\ PXVW EH FRQWUDVWHG
with  Matsuno  et  al.  (2004)  that  revealed  a  much  less  stable  
FRORUFODVVL¿FDWLRQLQDGLIIHUHQWFKLPSDQ]HHZLWKUHGXFHG
abilities  for  symbol  use.  The  fact  that  the  monkeys  in  Fagot  
et  al.  (2006)  were  only  prepared  to  match  colors  that  were  
very   similar   to   the   training   stimuli  must  make   the   human  
W\SHRIEURDGFRORUFDWHJRULHVGLI¿FXOWIRUWKHPWRDFKLHYH
One  further  potential  limitation  to  training  color  categories  
in  the  monkey  might  be  their  supposed  inability  to  perform  
analogical  reasoning.  It  might  be  thought  a  likely  limitation  
as  analogical  reasoning  has  been  argued  to  be  promoted  by  
linguistic  competencies  (Gentner  &  Christie,  2008),  and  that  
color  categorization  also  requires  linguistic  ability.  However,  
the  human  ability  to  categorize  colors  does  not  rely  on  the  
ability  to  reason  analogically  (Davidoff  &  Roberson,  2004).  
Furthermore,  while   it  has  been  argued   that  only   language-­
trained  (Premack,  1983)  or  token-­trained  (Thompson,  Oden  
&   Boysen,   1997)   apes   can   perform   analogical   reasoning  
tasks,  recent  work  by  Fagot  and    Parron  (in  press)  suggests  
that,   even   in   the   absence   of   language-­   or   token-­training,  
monkeys   seem   to      be   able   to   judge   the   relation   between  
relations.  
$QLQFRQVLVWHQF\$YLDQFRORUFDWHJRULHV  
Wright   and   Cumming   (1971)   examined  MTS   for   color  
in  pigeons.  Their  pigeons  produced  cross-­over  points   (i.e.,  
boundaries)  between  the  training  stimuli  in  the  MTS  though  
not   at   the   same  points   as   for  human  primary  colors.  They  
suggested   that   these   boundaries   correspond   to   divisions  
of   the  spectrum  analogous   to  human  color  naming  (Beare,  
1963).   Furthermore,   Wright   and   Cumming   (1971)   also  
carried   out   MTS   experiments   where   the   range   of   colors  
)LJXUH3HUFHQWDJHRIFRUUHFWUHVSRQVHVIRUEDERRQVDQGKXPDQVDQGIRUFURVVDQGZLWKLQFDWHJRU\SDLUVXVLQJWKHEOXH
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was   altered  but   the   cross-­over   points   remained   stubbornly  
at   the   same   wavelengths.      Hence,   they   titled   their   paper  
“color  naming  in  the  pigeon”.  They  suggested  that  humans,  
like  their  pigeons,  would  divide  the  continuum  at  the  same  
boundary  point  irrespective  of  the  shift  of  the  training  stimuli.  
We   have   recently   conducted   a   similar   experiment   with  
humans   and   baboons   (Davidoff,   Goldstein,   Tharp,  Wakui  
&  Fagot,  submitted)  but  with  a  quite  different  outcome  for  
the   two   species.   The   baboons   again   showed   no   evidence  
of  a  color  boundary.  It  is  somewhat  surprising  that  pigeons  
may  express  CP  of  colors,  but  not  the  baboons.  One  answer  
could  come  from  Jones,  Osorio  and  Baddeley   (2001)  who  
found   that   chicks   would   interpolate   between   two   training  
stimuli  but  not  extrapolate  outside  the  range.  The  outcome  
of  the  chick’s  behavior  could  be  to  provide  boundaries  that  
apparently  divide  their  color  space  into  categories.  
&RQFOXVLRQV
Berlin   and   Kay   (1969)   classically   proposed   that   color  
categories   are   innate;;   a   hypothesis   clearly   consonant  with  
studies   that   have   found   color   CP   in   pigeons   (Wright   &  
Cumming,  1971),  monkeys  (Sandell  et  al.,  1979)  and  in  human  
infants  (Bornstein  et  al.,  1976;;  Franklin  et  al.,  2008).  Thus,  
the  previous  nonhuman  and  infant  data  pose  a  considerable  
question  to  those  who  propose  that  color  categories  derive  
from  the  color  terms  in  the  speaker’s  language.  Despite  these  
reports,   the   arguments   for   a   linguistic,   and   thus   learned,  
origin  of  most  color  categories  are  now  at  least  incorporated  
into  the  universal  theories  of  color  category  formation  (Kay  
et  al.,  2005)  widely  accepted  from  the  human  data.  Here,  we  
enhance  the  claim  for  a  linguistic  contribution  to  color  CP  
by  demonstrating  that  only  humans,  and  not  baboons,  show  
a  cross-­category  advantage   in  a  color   recognition  CP  task.  
7KLV ¿QGLQJ FRQYHUJHV ZLWK RXU SUHYLRXV GHPRQVWUDWLRQ
of   human-­baboon   differences   in   color  matching   (Fagot   et  
al.,   2006).   Categorization   of   continuous   types   of   stimuli,  
such   as   colors,   seems   both   facilitated   and   constrained  
by   the   acquisition   and   use   of   linguistic   terms.  We   might  
even  presume   that   the  need   to   solve   these  unidimensional  
categorization  problems  was  a  driving  force  for  the  evolution  
of  language  (Davidoff,  2001).  
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